The relative impact of corporate reputation on consumer choice: beyond a halo effect by Burke, PF et al.
1 
 
The Relative Impact of Corporate Reputation on Consumer Choice: Beyond a Halo Effect 
Associate Professor Paul F. Burke 
UTS School of Business (Building 8) 
University of Technology Sydney (UTS),  
PO BOX 123 Broadway NSW 2007 Australia 
Phone: +61 2 9514 3533 
paul.burke@uts.edu.au 
 
Professor Grahame Dowling 
University of Technology Sydney (UTS) 
PO BOX 123 Broadway NSW 2007 Australia 
Phone: +61 2 9514 4052 
grahame.dowling@uts.edu.au 
 
Dr Edward Wei 
University of Technology Sydney (UTS),  
PO BOX 123 Broadway NSW 2007 Australia 




Paul Burke is Associate Professor and ARC Research Fellow at the University of Technology 
Sydney. His work focuses on choice modelling and ethical consumption. He has published in the 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, Research Policy, Journal of Product Innovation 
& Management, International Business Review, European Journal of Marketing, Journal of 
Business Ethics, Journal of Operations Management and Tourism Analysis.  
 
Grahame Dowling is Professor at UTS School of Business. His research, relating to corporate 
reputation and marketing, has been published in Strategic Management Journal, MIT Sloan 
Management Review, Californian Management Review, European Management Review, Journal 
of Marketing and Journal of Consumer Research. His latest book is Winning the Reputation 
Game. 
 
Edward Wei is a Senior Research Associate at UTS from which he received his PhD. He also 
holds a Masters of Business from QUT and a Bachelor of Economics from University of 
International Business & Economics (UIBE), China. Edward has worked with various 
companies, including AC Nielsen, as a quantitative analyst, operations and survey manager. He 
has published in journals such as Design Science, Agenda, and Energy Policy.  
 
Acknowledgement and Financial Disclosure: 
The researchers acknowledge the assistance of colleagues and reviewers that have provided 
feedback and assistance, particularly Prof Marc Fischer and Dr Natalina Zlatevska. The research 




The Relative Impact of Corporate Reputation on Consumer Choice: Beyond a Halo Effect 
 
Abstract 
Previous work suggests that corporate reputation generates a ‘halo effect’ where products from 
companies with better reputations are more likely to be chosen. We argue that corporate 
reputation plays a more expansive role, proposing that consumers will be less price-sensitive to 
offerings endorsed by companies with good reputations and that it moderates the marginal utility 
of product features with high clarity. We also propose that an individual’s knowledge of a 
company increases the likelihood its products will be purchased. Using a choice model 
incorporating an individual SEM-based reputation measure, we find support for these 
hypothesised effects in the context of television choices. The results suggest that corporate 
reputation warrants more attention by marketing managers to increase preferences for their 
products through these mechanisms. 
Keywords:  
corporate branding; marketing management; corporate social responsibility (CSR), ethics;  




Upon occasion, companies become embroiled in scandals and crises relating to various issues 
ranging from financial performance, questions of leadership, treatment of employees or impact 
of their operations on the natural environment. Some recent examples include: the Volkswagen 
emissions scandal; the convictions of the CEOs from WorldCom and Computer Associates for 
accounting and securities fraud; and, the exposure of organizational issues with respect to an 
alleged culture of sexism within Uber Technologies and Google. Alternatively, many companies 
undertake deliberate activities that shed a positive light on their operations. For example, this 
may include corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities such as those aimed at improving 
labour conditions or addressing environmental concerns in the supply chain or the sponsorship of 
a charitable event (Auger, Burke, Devinney, & Louviere, 2003). Other companies may promote 
their reputation based on their competencies to enhance the evaluation of the overall product, 
such as the culture of innovativeness associated with companies like 3M (Gürhan-Canli & Batra, 
2004). These communications can occur through various mediums including shareholder reports, 
corporate advertising, media coverage, corporate websites, and consumer reports (Schlegelmilch 
& Pollach, 2005). All such activities – whether negative or positive – affect the overall corporate 
reputation of the organization across all its stakeholder groups (Fombrun, 1996).  
The issue of interest for marketing managers explored in this paper is the potential of a 
good or poor reputation to spill-over to a company’s branded products as they are being 
evaluated by consumers. To date, some research suggests that there are cases in which 
consumers ignore reputation in their product choice deliberations (e.g., Boulstridge & Carrigan, 
2000; Page & Fearn, 2005). However, the vast majority of scholars assume that consumers do 
factor the reputation of the company that stands behind or beside the product into their 
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evaluations and choices (e.g., Auger et al., 2003; Dowling, 2016a; Fombrun, 1996; Gatti, 
Caruana, & Snehota, 2012; Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001; Srivoravilai, Melewar, Martin, 
&Yannopoulou, 2011; Walsh, Mitchell, Jackson, & Beatty, 2009). The aim of this research is to 
evaluate whether consumer choices are influenced by the reputation of the company that uses its 
name to brand products. We explore various pathways by which this occurs.  
The research aims to make substantive and methodological contributions to the reputation 
and branding literatures which allow us to offer several strategic insights. First, the research 
investigates the relative impact of corporate reputation in influencing how consumers choose 
among a number of competing products. As such, it differs from previous research that has 
evaluated the impact of corporate reputation on the purchase intentions relating to one product 
(e.g., Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001) or one organization only (e.g., Walsh et al., 2009). By focusing 
on consumer choices, it also differs from research that has focused on non-choice outcomes, such 
as attitudes, trust and identification (e.g. Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007; Keh & Xie, 2009); or 
other behaviours such as increased word-of-mouth (e.g., Lacey & Kennett-Hensel, 2010; Walsh 
et al., 2009). Our research design allows us to see the impact of changes in corporate reputation 
on consumer choice outcomes relative to the impact that changes in a product’s features have 
(unlike, for example, Arikan, Kantur, Maden, & Telci, 2016). The methodology provides the first 
link between latent performance measures of corporate reputation based on reflective rating 
scales (e.g. Walsh et al., 2009) and multi-attribute accounts of product decision making using 
choice models (e.g., Auger et al., 2003; De Pelsmacker, Driesen, & Rayp, 2005). Second, we 
account for individual differences in the valuation of a company’s reputation, rather than 
examine such effects at an aggregate level or by making comparisons across experimental 
conditions. This addresses concerns about aggregation bias in evaluating the impact of corporate 
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reputation on choices (Hutchinson, Kamakura, & Lynch, 2000). Third, we examine reputation in 
relation to existing organizations rather than the evaluation of hypothetical or unlabelled 
alternatives (e.g., Auger et al., 2003; Mohr & Webb, 2005). Fourth, we explore whether 
corporate reputation is simply a mechanism that affects the propensity to choose a product (a 
generic halo effect) or whether the effect is multi-faceted. In particular, we examine whether 
corporate reputation affects price sensitivity and moderates the preference for product features.  
To preview the findings, we find support for the general halo effect that corporate 
reputation activities can influence product choices by improving the utility of a product offered 
by the company. We also find that individual level corporate reputation evaluations spill-over in 
a number of ways to reduce (increase) price-sensitivity and increase (decrease) the preference for 
longer warranties when offered by companies with good (poor) reputations. As such, the 
research speaks to marketing managers by indicating new strategies whereby corporate 
reputation can be leveraged across product features rather than be treated simply as a halo effect. 
Indeed, we find the impact of corporate reputation on choice is substantial relative to the 
competitive advantage offered by variation in product features. However, we find no evidence 
that consumers’ preference for products that offer features that are poorly understood regarding 
their benefit can be somehow improved when offered by companies with better reputations.  
The paper proceeds as follows. To establish the background theoretical context, we briefly 
review the nature of corporate reputation, corporate branding, and how corporate reputations 
have been found to impact consumer behaviour. We then present a model of how corporate 
reputation affects consumers’ choices about a company’s product offerings against those of their 
competitors. We describe a choice-based method to measure how much of an impact corporate 
reputation has on product choices as well as how much it moderates the impact of variation in 
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product features on consumers' choices.  
 
Corporate Reputation and Product Branding 
In the field of strategy the notion of corporate reputation is well developed (e.g., Barnett & 
Pollock, 2012). Here economists and management scholars have studied the conditions under 
which the reputation of a company is used by its multiple stakeholders to help them make 
decisions about whether or not to engage with it (e.g., Devinney, Dowling, & Perm-
Ajchariyawong, 2008; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Roper & Davies, 2007). One example that is 
familiar to most readers of this journal is the market for MBA programs. These are typically 
branded or co-branded with the name of the parent university. Here we see senior university 
administrators, deans, faculty, students, and alumni taking a keen interest in the reputation of 
their school because it acts as a measure of past performance, a signal of inherent quality, and an 
attractive attribute to faculty and students. Of particular interest is the role that a good reputation 
plays in influencing student (consumer) choice. For example, it can attract more students; help 
decrease their sensitivity to higher fees, and improve perceptions about the quality of faculty and 
facilities. The first effect is broad in nature, like a halo effect; the second effect focuses on price 
sensitivity, and the third effect focuses on how preference for a particular product feature can be 
moderated by the nature of a good (or bad) reputation. In this paper, we explore the ability of a 
good reputation to produce all these effects in the context of consumer choices. 
Because the concept of corporate reputation has been studied from various academic 
discipline and stakeholder perspectives there are many (similar) definitions in use. The overlap 
with other terms, such as corporate brand, corporate image, and corporate identity further adds to 
confusion about the precise meaning of the construct (Balmer, 2001; Gatti et al., 2012). 
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Notwithstanding this diversity, Dowling’s (2016b) review of the construct suggests that the most 
common interpretation is that a corporate reputation is an individual’s overall evaluation of a 
company. Some suggest that this is similar to that of an attitude (e.g., Caruana, Cohen, & 
Krentler, 2006). This evaluation is based on the company’s key attributes, performance and 
behaviour. A good reputation acts as a signal of quality and a performance bond to internal 
stakeholders such as employees and external stakeholders such as customers. Because companies 
are expected to live up to their reputations they generally endeavour to maintain or enhance 
stakeholder evaluations. 
From a strategic perspective, corporate reputation, therefore, has many of the attributes of 
an intangible asset because it is difficult for rivals to imitate, acquire or substitute, and can offer 
opportunities to gain a competitive advantage (Rindova & Martins, 2012). Accounting often 
evaluates corporate reputation in terms of an intangible asset and goodwill, whereas 
organizational behaviour can evaluate it in terms of perceptions among existing and potential 
employees and other internal stakeholders (Balmer, 1998).Whilst from economics, reputation is a 
signal of the quality of a company’s behaviour and products (Allen, 1984; Shapiro, 1982, 1983). 
From a corporate perspective the concepts of branding, image, identity and reputation are used to 
reflect both how an organization seeks to project itself to its stakeholders (e.g., its desired brand 
position), and how it is perceived by these groups (e.g., its actual brand position). Different 
scholars thereby provide different interpretations of how these projections translate into 
perceptions and evaluations (e.g., Balmer, 2001; Balmer & Gray, 2003; de Chernatony, 1999; 
Schultz, Hatch, & Adams, 2012; Yu Xie & Boggs, 2006).  
In the discipline of marketing, corporate reputation can be viewed from the customer or 
end-users’ perspective (Balmer, 1998) and is sometimes considered as similar to brand equity 
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(Aaker, 2004; Erdem & Swait, 1998; Kocak, Abimbola, & Özer, 2007). Because the drivers of 
brand equity are similar to those of corporate reputation, namely, brand knowledge (Keller, 
2003) and company knowledge, this is understandable. Such a view is consistent with corporate 
reputation being a holistic judgement made by consumers about a company’s attributes, which 
evolves over time and is reinforced via communication and performance (Gary & Balmer, 1998).  
Our perspective is that corporate branding differs from product branding because of its 
strategic focus, namely, a) the company rather than the product is prominent; b) the corporate 
brand speaks to all stakeholders rather than just target consumers; and, c) corporate brands tend 
to be the responsibility of senior executives rather than brand managers (Balmer, 2001). Thus, 
since corporate brands reflect the values, capabilities, culture and actions of the entire 
corporation and its employees (Keller & Richey, 2006) it presents many challenges with respect 
to resourcing, management, and obtaining cross-functional support (Balmer & Gray, 2003; Yu 
Xie & Boggs, 2006). This also means that the impact of corporate reputation activities can be 
visible across multiple unrelated product categories (Balmer, 2001). Our perspective also 
highlights that building a good corporate reputation is driven by a variety of organizational level 
activities, some of which involve mainstream marketing activities such as advertising, and some 
of which are beyond the control of marketing managers, such as media reporting (Yu Xie & 
Boggs, 2006). As Keller and Lehmann (2006) suggest, these sets of activities interact.  
Product branding thereby focuses on individual brands with respect to product quality, 
service, innovativeness of features, with a focus on current and prospective consumers. At a 
wider level, corporate branding focuses on attributes of the company that support its potentially 
broad range of products and services, with a broader consideration of stakeholders beyond 
consumers. As such, in some cases corporate reputation overlaps with aspects of brand 
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reputation (Napoli, Dickinson-Delaporte, & Beverland, 2016). In cases where a product carries 
the company name, these attributes can be a potent source of product utility alongside sources of 
utility derived from the product features themselves. As such, a key aspect of the branding 
strategy of a company is whether or not to link the company name to its products and services 
(Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2000). The present research examines, in relative terms, the utility that 
consumers derive from corporate reputation and product features, and whether the interaction 
between them further amplifies the utility of a product to alter consumer choices. 
 
The Impact of Corporate Reputation on Consumer Behaviour 
The primary mechanism that marketers use to link a company to its products is by the way that 
the corporate name is used in product and service names. For example, some products are 
branded under the company name (e.g., Head tennis racquets ; Sony televisions), while others 
combine the company and product names (e.g., 3M’s Scotch tape; Nestlé Kit Kat), and others put 
the company name in small print on the label of the product (e.g., Head & Shoulders shampoo 
made by Procter & Gamble). Aaker (2004) has referred to the first two strategies as creating a 
‘branded house’, an approach which aims to leverage positive associations about the company 
(Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2000). Here the company stands with the product or clearly beside it 
and if consumers know about the company its reputation may become a prominent attribute of 
the offering for target customers. In the last case, which Aaker calls a ‘house of brands’, rather 
than seek to link the product to the company the emphasis is to create brands with a stand-alone 
position or a strong value proposition. In the former case, the company behind the brand and its 
corporate reputation is an integral part of the product branding strategy and the value proposition 
for consumers; particularly when the organization’s corporate brand is prominent (e.g., Fombrun, 
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Gardberg, & Sever, 2000; Gatti et al., 2012). 
From a conventional brand perspective, corporate reputation is a potential secondary 
source of a consumer’s brand knowledge (Keller, 2003) and may be triggered if the company’s 
branding, communication or identity strategy highlights that the company stands behind or 
beside the product brand. When this happens, studies have suggested that consumers do factor 
into their deliberations the attributes of companies and their overall reputation. For example, 
Dawar and Parker (1994) found that consumers use the reputation of a retailer as a signal of 
product quality. Brown and Dacin (1997) found that the perceived ability and social 
responsibility of well-known companies influenced the consumers’ beliefs and attitudes about 
the new products they manufactured. Nguyen and Leblanc (2001) found that corporate reputation 
affects customer loyalty. Gürhan-Canli and Batra (2004) used experiments to illustrate that a 
company’s reputation for innovation and trustworthiness affects consumer evaluations for a 
product made by that company in a situation characterized by a high level of perceived risk. 
Klein and Dawar (2004) showed how a company’s reputation for social responsibility affects 
consumers’ attributions for blame in a product-harm crisis. Gatti et al. (2012) found that a good 
corporate reputation was correlated with a higher purchase intention for Italian Christmas cake. 
Helm (2013) showed that a good corporate reputation dampened customers’ potential negative 
reactions to price increases. In a series of experiments, Chernev and Blair (2015) showed that a 
reputation for social responsibility could influence consumer perceptions of the functional 
performance of the company’s products. And Habel, Schons, Alavi, and Wieseke (2016) found 
that the perceptions of a company’s social responsibility created mixed effects of the company’s 
perceived price fairness. 
Like many studies of consumer behaviour most empirical studies of corporate reputation 
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use an attitude-behaviour approach to study how the perceived capabilities, character or practices 
of a company influences reaction to its actions, products and services. Fewer studies consider 
how corporate reputation influences a consumer’s choice amongst directly competing products. 
That is, most work considers the role of corporate reputation in terms of just one corporation 
(e.g., Arikan et al., 2016; Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001; Walsh et al., 2009) or in terms of its impact 
on non-behavioural outcomes such as trust (e.g., Du et al., 2007; Keh & Xie, 2009) or word-of-
mouth (e.g., Lacey & Kennett-Hensel, 2010; Walsh et al., 2009), and without reference to how 
corporate reputation plays a role in consumer’s decision making relative to product features they 
encounter in their choices. 
One exception is work by Auger et al. (2003) who examined consumers’ willingness to pay 
for social product features. The social product features were described in terms of supplier 
manufacturing practices, such as not employing child labour or paying workers above the 
minimum wage. The choice experiments asked consumers to choose amongst products described 
using a combination of functional and social features. They found that the socially responsible 
practices used to enhance a company’s reputation were significant determinants of product 
choice. Whilst the study considered consumers’ choice amongst competing offerings, the role of 
brands in each case was presented in terms of an overarching halo effect (via a brand-specific 
constant) where it was assumed a more preferred brand (e.g., Nike) had a higher propensity to be 
chosen than a less preferred brand (e.g., Reebok). From this study, it is not clear whether 
variation in the corporate reputation of these brands at an individual level had some capacity to 
alter choice, and whether preferences for the functional features of the product or sensitivity to 
the pricing of products offered by each brand were somehow dependent on these evaluations of 
reputation. To date, research involving choices where organizational-level activities (like CSR) 
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or outcomes of such activities (namely, corporate reputation) has only considered general halo 
effects, such that brands with better reputations are more likely to be chosen. 
As we will develop further in the next section, a good (or poor) reputation can enhance 
(decrease) the likelihood that a particular product will be chosen over competing products. The 
primary mechanism by which this can happen is a halo effect whereby the overall evaluation of 
the company influences evaluations of the product’s features in a way that is consistent with this 
overall evaluation. When the quality of the features of the product or service are difficult to 
assess before consumption the reputation of the company may play a significant role in helping 
to reduce perceived risk (e.g., Gürhan-Canli & Batra, 2004). We propose that understanding the 
relative impact of corporate reputation in the context of consumer choice requires a consideration 
of how consumers make trade-offs between brand names, product features, prices, and the 
reputation of the company behind this offering. Further, the way in which these elements interact 
also suggests several ways corporate reputation may enter consumers’ product valuations. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework and Development of Hypotheses  
Overview of Consumer-Based Choice Model of Corporate Reputation  
Our research focuses on how the reputation of a company alters the utility of a product when it is 
being considered for purchase and thereby alters choice outcomes. Our research hypotheses 
shown in Figure 1 explicitly focus on the role of corporate reputation in the evaluation of 
competing products (i.e., judging the utility of each) and choice (i.e., via a process of utility 
maximization). In Figure 1, the latent utility is impacted by several components, and, consistent 
with most choice frameworks in marketing, we include a number of product-related factors, 
namely, brand, price and product features (e.g., Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000). In the 
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present research, we further consider various hypotheses on how corporate reputation influences 
the utility of a product. By observing how choices are made among a number of competing 
products with various attributes and features, and under the assumption of utility maximization, 
we are able to formulate a probabilistic model of consumers decision making (Luce, 1959; 
McFadden, 1974, 1986; Thurstone, 1927) expanded to include corporate reputation.  
.  
FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
To provide an overview, the first hypothesis postulates that the utility of a product is 
determined by its attributes and brand name. The product with the highest utility will be the most 
preferred in a choice situation. The second hypothesis (halo effect of CR) partials out the 
corporate reputation effect from the brand name effect, similar to studies in marketing evaluating 
the impact of brand equity on choice (e.g., Erdem & Swait, 1998). This shows how much of the 
overall brand effect is due to the reputation of the company whose name appears on the product. 
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The third hypothesis (price effect of CR) focuses on the effect of a good corporate reputation on 
price sensitivity. The fourth hypothesis (attribute effect of CR) focuses on how corporate 
reputation affects the marginal utility relating to a specific product feature. Finally, we account 
for the impact that consumer’s knowledge of the product category and knowledge of the 
company have on the utility of the product. We now discuss the background to each of these 
hypothesized effects in more detail 
 
Impact of Brands, Price and Features on Choice (Basic Product Choice Model) 
First, under the assumption of utility maximization, the model assumes that a consumer will 
choose the product that offers greater utility when considered against all others (Thurstone, 
1927). As such, our work in the context of corporate reputation is distinct in terms of focusing on 
competing product choices rather than focusing on evaluation of a company overall in terms of 
its reputation (e.g., Walsh et al., 2009) or considering the overall likelihood of choosing an 
option without explicit comparison to another (e.g., Gatti et al., 2012). In this way, our random 
utility theory based framework is similar to the work of Auger et al. (2003) who adopted it in the 
context of studying the impact of ethical product features on consumers’ choices, but instead we 
examine the impact of a company’s reputation on consumers’ choices. 
As such, our first hypothesis focuses on the basic way in which models of utility 
maximization have been considered in marketing (e.g., Brazell et al., 2006; Burke, 2013; Erdem 
et al., 2002; Louviere et al., 2000; Louviere & Woodworth, 1983; Swait, Erdem, Louviere, & 
Dubelaar, 1993). That is, the utility of the product is determined by the characteristics or 
attributes which distinguish it from others, including its brand name, its price and product 
features. Under the assumption of utility maximization, consumers are assumed to choose the 
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one product that provides maximum utility relative to all other competing products and to do so 
when this utility exceeds the utility associated with not choosing any of the alternatives under 
consideration (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974, 1986).  
More formally, the model can be considered in terms of a random utility framework. The 
utility of product ‘j’ can be broken into utility that can be captured or measured by the researcher 
(i.e., the systematic component of the utility function, Vj) and those that cannot (i.e., the random 
component, εj). The systematic component can then be described by a function of the attributes 
of the alternative and characteristics of the individual. Applying random utility theory, we 
observe that the jth alternative is chosen by individual ‘i’, iff Uj > Uq for all j≠q under 
consideration. To link the expression of utility to the observable choice outcomes, yij, can be 
done by assuming the random component follows a suitable distribution (e.g., extreme value type 
1; probit), giving rise to the unconditional choice probability (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; 
Train, 2009): 
(1)  






Applied to the present research, we first consider that the latent utility of product ‘j’ 
(Uj) is a function of its brand name (Brandj), its various product features (Xj) and its price 
(Pricej). The overall utility of an alternative is: 
 (2)  Uj = Vj + εj = α+ β1Brandj + β2Xj + β3Pricej + εj 
Equation (2) is a base model that reflects the nature of the utility underlying choices that 
consumers make in everyday settings and in many choice experiments given to 
respondents. Our hypothesis is that respondents choose the best product based on a 
combination of brand, attributes and price. Thus, we expect β1, β2 and β3 to be significant in 
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the choice model. That is, we first hypothesize that consumers will place greater utility on 
products when offered by a more preferable brand (H1a), when offered at a lower price 
(H1b), and when offered with features that are more valuable than those that are not (H1c). 
We now develop the model further to consider how corporate reputation may affect the 
utility of an alternative and subsequent observable choice outcomes. 
 
Overarching Impact of Corporate Reputation (Halo Effect) 
The next component of the model considers how corporate reputation provides a general 
improvement in the evaluation of products when offered by a brand associated with a more 
reputable company. We hypothesize that products offered by companies with better reputations 
will generate greater utility in product evaluations, and hence, will be more likely to be chosen 
when considered against competing products. The hypothesis reflects the general belief that 
building better brands leads to better valuations among consumers (Walsh et al., 2009) and is 
consistent with the empirical work that has considered purchase intentions. For example, using a 
structural equation model of reputation and corporate social responsibility, Gatti et al. (2012) 
show that corporate reputation has a positive impact on purchase intentions, measured using two 
7-point scale items relating to strength of intentions to select and purchase a brand of Panettone 
Christmas cake. Similarly, Mohr and Webb (2005) illustrated that intentions to purchase were 
higher for hypothetical companies undertaking corporate social responsibility activities. As such, 
we hypothesize that:  
H2: The utility of a product is higher for brands that are associated with companies that 
have better corporate reputations than their competitors. 
With respect to our utility-based choice model, we consider this effect at an individual level via 
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Corporate Reputation (CRij), which is the reputation evaluation that individual ‘i’ holds of a 
particular company ‘j’ offering a product evaluated for purchase. This variable captures the halo 
effect noted earlier, but takes into account how this can vary across individuals. In essence, H2 
differs from other studies by accounting for how corporate reputation is heterogeneous among 
consumers rather than evaluating its impact at an aggregate level only (Hutchinson et al., 2000). 
For example, Auger et al. (2003) captured the impact of Nike and Reebok on consumers’ 
evaluations of shoes, but did not account for how these evaluations varied at the individual level 
or whether these aggregate evaluations were related to the corporate reputation of the two 
companies. As a result, Equation (3) becomes an improved model for predicting how consumers 
make choices than Equation 1 by recognizing that corporate reputation is an evaluation that can 
vary across consumers and thereby results in variation in the utility assigned to each product: 
(3)  Uj = α+ β1Brandj + β2Xj + β3Pricej + β4CRij+ εij 
By considering product choices in a random utility framework, the impact of corporate 
reputation on product choices offers the opportunity to evaluate its effect against other product 
features on a comparable scale (i.e., utility). In other words, the model presents an opportunity to 
evaluate how much choices are altered by changes in individual perceptions of a company’s 
corporate reputation against changes in the features of the product. By further translating these 
changes in utility to the equivalent changes in prices indicated by the price coefficient, 
comparisons can be made in willingness-to-pay terms. In a similar vein, Auger et al. (2003) 
demonstrated the usefulness of this random utility/choice modelling approach to show the 
willingness-to-pay that consumers placed on changes in the functional features of products (e.g., 
the durability of a shoe; whether a soap is round or square) against changes in the social features 
of a product (e.g., whether a shoe is produced using child labour; whether a soap is tested on 
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animals). We do the same, but in terms of comparing the impact that changes in product features 
have on consumer choices against the impact that changes in individual-level evaluations of 
corporate reputation have on consumer choices.  
Impact of Corporate Reputation on Price Sensitivity (Price Effect) 
Whilst previous research suggests the overall utility of products is positively related to 
improvements in corporate reputation, other effects in consumer’s evaluations may also be 
occurring and can be considered by the choice framework. For example, Creyer (1997) found 
that consumers reported a disposition to reward (punish) ethical behaviour via a willingness to 
pay higher (lower) prices for products offered by firms demonstrating (un)ethical behaviours. 
Erdem, Swait, and Louviere (2002) found that consumers were willing to pay more for products 
when offered by higher equity brands relative to lower equity brands. Also, Helm (2013) found 
that a good corporate reputation helps to dampen customers’ potential negative reactions to a 
price increase. In turn, we hypothesize that companies that have better reputations will be able to 
command higher prices, whilst those with poorer reputations must accept that they must charge 
less for an equivalent product: 
H3: Consumers will be less (more) sensitive to the price of products that are made by a 
company with a better (poorer) corporate reputation. 
In a choice model, this effect can be captured by a price coefficient that is moderated 
depending on the corporate reputation of the company behind the brand. As such, we can 
expand our model of latent utility to consider this moderating effect (Pricej*CRij): 
(4)  Uj = α+ β1Brandj + β2Xj + β3Pricej + β4CRij+ β5Pricej*CRij+ εij 
In Equation (4), the price effect includes two components. First, the main effect (captured by β3) 
relates changes in price to changes in utility; this captures the sensitivity of consumers to price as 
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examined in Hypothesis 1b. Because most consumers will select a lower priced offering, all else 
being equal, we expect that β3 < 0 and significant. The second component is the interaction effect 
of CR and price; the estimate of β5 captures whether the sensitivity to changes in price is further 
moderated by variation in the corporate reputation of the company behind the offering. Given the 
preceding discussion and hypothesis, we predict that CR has a positive interaction on price, such 
that β5 will be positive and statistically significant. 
Impact of Corporate Reputation on Product Features (Attribute Effect) 
The multi-attribute nature of the choice framework allows the opportunity to explore other 
effects in terms of how each product feature impacts product choice, as considered in H1c. 
However, the preference for such features may depend on which company offers the feature. In 
other words and in terms of the random utility framework, the marginal utility associated with 
each product feature may be moderated by the perceived corporate reputation of the company 
offering the feature.  
Some previous literature suggests exploration of these effects in a number of areas. For 
example, prior research suggests that signals of quality are important in the context of warranties. 
For example, Boulding and Kirmani (1993), as well as Soberman (2003), argue that a longer 
warranty period is a signal from the company that they are confident that their products will last, 
thereby enticing consumers to infer a higher quality offering. As such, we expect consumers to 
prefer a warranty that is offered by a more reputable company than a less reputable company. In 
effect, a good reputation acts as a corporate performance bond (e.g., Dowling, 2016a). This 
assertion is consistent with other works that suggest that consumers seek and use a number of 
pre-purchase signals about the quality of the products being considered including price, physical 
appearance and reputation (Dawar & Parker, 1994). This view is also consistent with a risk 
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averse decision-making strategy, such as observed in Gürhan-Canli and Batra (2004) who used 
experiments to illustrate that a company’s reputation for innovation and trustworthiness affects 
consumer evaluations of a product made by that company in a situation characterized by a high 
level of perceived risk. In other words, positive reputations provide confidence in the face of 
uncertainty (Shapiro, 1982, 1983).  
Similarly, prior research in the context of meaningless and ambiguous product features 
further suggests that reputation can play a valuable role to mitigate risky decisions and inference 
making. For example, Broniarczyk and Gershoff (2003) find that the preference for products 
with trivial features – those features that consumers see as distinct from competitors, but unclear 
about their benefit – is more pronounced when offered uniquely by a high equity brand, but 
diminish if the nature of the triviality is disclosed or offered by a low equity brand. The 
hypothesis is consistent with the notion that preferences are not necessarily precise and well-
defined, but are often constructed on an ad-hoc basis dependent on the circumstances of the 
decision making context (or moment) in which consumers find themselves (March, 1978; 
McFadden, 1986). Similarly, Hsee (1996) finds that product features that are ambiguous in value 
(i.e., hard-to-evaluate) become easier-to-evaluate when presented alongside other options (i.e., 
joint-evaluation). As such, we argue that the marginal utility of a given product feature is further 
moderated by the corporate reputation of the firm standing behind the offering; however, the 
level of moderation is dependent on the clarity in value of the feature. Specifically, combing the 
findings of Hsee (1996) and Broniarczyk and Gershoff (2003) we hypothesise that the role of 
corporate reputation in supplementing the value placed on some product features diminishes in 
choice settings where several companies offer a similar product feature (as in many markets 
where product features are shared) and so the marginal utility of the ambiguous feature is 
21 
 
diminished. Instead, we hypothesize that the impact of corporate reputation will be stronger in 
cases where the product features are clearer in their value to consumers and when offered by 
multiple competitors, by predicting that consumers will prefer the quality signalled by the more 
reputable company. As such, we hypothesise that: 
  H4: The marginal utility of a product with features that consumers (do not) 
clearly understand will (not) be higher when offered by companies with better 
corporate reputations than their competitors. 
Under this hypothesis, we predict that CR has a moderating effect on the marginal utility offered 
by some product attributes, such that β6 is positive in the following:  
(5)  Uj =α+ β1Brandj + β2Xj + β3Pricej + β4CRij+ β5Pricej*CRij + β6Xj*CRij+ εij 
We suggest that the impact of perceived reputation of a company in moderating the 
marginal utility of product features will only apply to those that consumers clearly understand 
and that are considered to be functionally important. If a product feature is difficult to understand 
and thus is likely to be unimportant then the reputation of the company will not be potent enough 
to make it important (c.f., Carpenter, Glazer, & Nakamoto, 1994).  
Impact of Knowledge on Product Choices  
The final effects relate to variables accounting for differences in knowledge about the product 
category and the reputation of companies operating in the category. In general, most models of 
decision making indicate that more information or knowledge reduces the risk and uncertainty of 
judgements being made (Ratchford, 2001). As such, those consumers with more knowledge 
about a product category are in a position to more confidently evaluate alternatives, select and 
purchase a chosen offering rather than defer their product choice (Dhar, 1997). Similarly, better 
insights into the corporate reputation of a company can offer consumers a means to strengthen 
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their evaluations and reduce any need to delay following through with their product choice. This 
is consistent with one of the previously noted roles of a good corporate reputation in that in can 
act as a source of uncertainty reduction and confidence for consumers thereby reassuring them 
that the company that made the product will meet the expectations created by its marketing 
communications (Du et al., 2007; Keh & Xie, 2009; Ponzi, Fombrun, & Gardberg, 2011). From 
another perspective, Fombrun and van Riel (2004) suggest that salience is a primary driver of 
corporate reputation. Here, company ‘fame’ leads to company ‘fortune’. That is, the best known 
companies are the ones that have the best reputations and, in turn, this provides a competitive 
advantage. Under both arguments, we therefore predict: 
H5: The utility of a product will be higher when a consumer has a greater knowledge 
about the corporate reputation of the company offering the product. 
H6: Consumers with greater knowledge about a product category will have higher 
intentions to purchase.  
Under these hypothesized effects, the utility of an individual offering is therefore 
positively impacted by individual knowledge about the company behind the offering (CRKij) and 
the knowledge of the individual about the product category (PCKi). Incorporating these two 
knowledge-related variables into our model of overall product utility expands to the following: 
(6)  Uj =α+β1Brandj +β2Xj +β3Pricej+β4CRij+ β5Pricej*CRij + β6Xj*CRij +β7CRKij+β8PCKi + εij 
It is worth noting that under this equation, the impact of product category knowledge 
enhances the utility of all options under consideration (hence, the absence of the subscript ‘j’ in 
PCKi). As such, the overall utility of all options is raised against the no-choice option with utility 
set to zero for identification purposes. This translates to a higher propensity to purchase as 
hypothesized under H6 and subsequent prediction that β8 will be positive and significant. In 
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contrast, under H5 the knowledge is particular to a given alternative (hence, the presence of the 
subscript ‘j’ in the measure CRKij). In this regard, the utility is expected to be different for each 
alternative in a given choice set based on knowledge about the brand, and subsequently we 
predict that β7 will be positive and significant. 
In summary, this final model considers how corporate reputation affects the utility of the 
products that they offer against other competitors. It allows these effects to be considered in 
relative terms, such that it can be used to assess whether changes in the impact of corporate 
reputation on utility are just as relevant against changes in the functional features of the product 
in terms of altering consumer choices. Our model suggests multiple pathways for this impact of 
corporate reputation on choice to occur, namely: a) via a general halo effect; b) by altering the 
marginal utility of some product features; and, c) by altering price sensitivity. These effects are 
further considered in terms of the knowledge of a consumer. We now discuss the methodology 
that was used to test these hypothesized effects. 
 
Methodology 
We first conducted a preliminary study to select a set of brands and product features, and to test 
the validity of our principal measure of corporate reputation. We then used an experimental 
choice-based methodology to test our hypotheses. We conducted the test of the hypothesized 
effects in the context of television choices. This category was anticipated to be a reasonably 
involved purchase such that the impact of price, product features and corporate reputation would 
require deliberation relative to choices where more habitual decision-making may occur. Also, 
televisions are tangible, heterogeneous products that are familiar to most people. Thus, unlike 
something like electricity where it is the company rather than the product that provides the major 
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source of differentiation (see Walsh, Dinnie, & Wiedmann, 2006), televisions can be evaluated 
on the basis of their features and/or the company that makes them. Also, televisions provided the 
opportunity to identify a reasonable set of product features that varied with respect to clarity in 
order to test H4. 
Pre-test 
An extensive search of retailer websites was used to identify a list of 21 available corporate 
brand named televisions and a list of 22 features that described these televisions. We then 
interviewed 116 people selected from a commercial consumer panel who were screened as being 
reasonably knowledgeable about televisions. We asked respondents about their awareness of 
each brand by asking them to select (via a tick box) those manufacturers that they had heard of. 
We also asked them about which companies that produced these brands had the best and worst 
reputations out of a total of 21 brands, as well as rating each on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 10 
(very good) with respect to their overall corporate reputation. From these results, we selected 
three well-known brands to be used in the main choice study, namely, Sony, Panasonic and 
Toshiba. The choice to use three Japanese companies also avoided any confound associated with 
country-of-origin effects. The profile of these brands is shown in Table 1.  
We also measured the corporate reputation of the two companies that respondents 
nominated as having the best and worst reputation from the set of brands that they had heard of. 
The measure of corporate reputation was the Reputation Quotient (RQ) (see, Fombrun et al., 
2000). This 20-item measure is composed of six underlying constructs, namely: 1) emotional 
appeal; 2) innovativeness and quality of products; 3) vision and leadership; 4) workplace 
environment; 5) social and environmental responsibility; and, 6) financial performance. Each 
respondent rated how much they agreed or disagreed with various statements reflective of these 
25 
 
constructs on a scale on a 7-point scale (1=totally disagree; 7 = totally agree). From these 
responses we used confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling to confirm that 
the structure of this RQ measure aligned with prior works (e.g., Agarwal, Osiyevskyy, & 
Feldman, 2015; Fombrun & van Riel, 2004). Details of the measure and analysis are provided in 
Appendix 1. These measures were then adopted for use in the main study. 
We also asked respondents to rate each of the 22 product features on clarity and 
importance. Importance was measured on a 7-point scale with respondents asked how much they 
consider a feature when purchasing a new television (1=not important; 7=very important). 
Clarity was measured on a 7-point scale with respondents asked to indicate how much they 
understood each feature (1=not clear at all; 7=very clear). Based on their responses, we selected 
11 features that ranged from low to high in importance and in clarity (see Table 2). These 
features were categorized into three groups, namely, (1) highly important and high in clarity – 
price, warranty and screen size, (2) moderately important and moderately high in clarity – wall 
mounting, super slim, number of USB ports, and personal video recorder (PVR), (3) moderately 
important, but low in clarity – 24P cinema, DTS (input-output), backlight control, and dynamic 
range control. There were no features that were identified as highly important but concurrently 




Table 1: EVALUATION OF TELEVISION BRANDS USED IN MAIN STUDY  
 Awareness of  
Company (%) 
CR Ranking  CR  
Rating Ranked Best (%) 
Ranked Worst 
(%) 
Sony 92.2 25.9 2.6  7.15^ (1.81) 
Panasonic 96.6 12.1 0.0  6.78 (1.76) 
Toshiba 80.2 1.7 4.3  6.17 (1.80) 
% refers to proportion of pilot sample (n=116);  
^ refers to mean rating; standard deviation shown in parentheses 
 
 
Table 2: EVALUATION OF TELEVISION FEATURES USED IN MAIN STUDY  
Product Feature Importance   Clarity 
High Importance / High Clarity M SD 95% CI   M SD 95% CI 
Price of television 6.04 1.18 (5.83,6.26)   5.85 1.42 (5.59,6.11) 
Size of television (inches) 5.93 1.15 (5.72,6.14)   5.74 1.45 (5.47,6.01) 
Warranty 5.86 1.25 (5.63,6.09)   5.72 1.53 (5.43,6.00) 
                
Moderate Importance / Moderate Clarity M SD 95% CI   M SD 95% CI 
Slim super slim television design 4.90 1.42 (4.64,5.16)   5.36 1.56 (5.08,5.65) 
Personal Video Recorder (PVR) 4.61 1.82 (4.45,5.12)   5.16 1.62 (4.86,5.45) 
Number of USB ports 4.71 1.67 (4.40,5.01)   5.28 1.67 (4.98,5.59) 
Wall mountable 4.78 1.85 (4.27,4.95)   5.50 1.65 (5.20,5.80) 
                
Moderate Importance / Low Clarity M SD 95% CI   M SD 95% CI 
Dynamic Range Control 4.70 1.50 (4.42,4.98)   4.24 1.98 (3.88,4.61) 
Backlight Control 4.64 1.66 (4.33,4.94)   4.22 2.04 (3.84,4.59) 
DTS 2.0+Digital Out 4.39 1.64 (4.09,4.69)   4.05 2.03 (3.68,4.42) 
24P True Cinema 4.32 1.69 (4.01,4.63)   3.93 1.95 (3.57,4.29) 





Overview of Main Study 
The main study involved several components including: a) a rating task to measure the corporate 
reputation of three companies as per the pre-test (Appendix 1); b) knowledge measures regarding 
each company and the product category; c) a choice experiment to measure the relative impact of 
corporate reputation of products offered by these companies alongside their product features; 
and, d) manipulation checks relating to the clarity of the product features. The ratings tasks 
provided data to construct our corporate reputation measure; a latent, unobservable construct that 
varied for each individual and each company. The individual corporate reputation measures were 
then incorporated into the choice model to determine how much of the brand name effect due to 
the corporate reputation drives product selection relative to other attributions triggered by the 
product. To do this we created a set of experimentally designed choice tasks that included brand 
name, price, and a set of other product features. Experimentally designed choice tasks are a well-
established method for quantifying how consumers make trade-offs across these when evaluating 
competing products (Louviere et al., 2000). We now describe the details of this choice 
experiment in more detail. 
Choice Experiment 
The choice experiment task showed each respondent four television options at a time. Eight such 
tasks completed in total (see Figure 2). Each television was described by a number of features 
including: brand (Sony, Panasonic or Toshiba), price (a uniform random value between $1,499 
and $1,999), warranty (1 or 3 years) and screen size (50 or 55 inch). As noted earlier, in our pre-
test these features were found to be highly important and associated with a high level of clarity. 
Televisions were also described by a set of moderately important features that varied with 
respect to being low or high clarity, and each television was presented as having two out of eight 
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possible features using a completely randomized design. The moderately important features with 
high clarity included whether a television: a) was wall mountable; b) was of super slim design; c) 
had a large number of USB ports; and d) had a personal TV/video-recorder (PVR) feature. 
Likewise the moderately important attributes with low clarity were: a) 24 true cinema; b) DTS 
2.0 + Digital output; c) backlight control; and d) Dynamic Range Control. Each television was 
also described by a set of fixed features, namely, each television was described as being an LED-
LCD television, with FHD and a HD tuner at a refresh rate of 100Hz. The pre-test research of the 
television market suggested that these fixed specifications defined a television set that ranged in 
size from 50 to 55 inches and was priced between $1,500 and $2,000 as manipulated above.  
 
 





Each respondent completed eight choice tasks. In each choice task, we asked respondents 
to nominate their most and least preferred television from four options labelled A, B, C and D, 
and to indicate how likely they were to purchase their preferred option. The same brand was used 
in options A and B and another single brand in options C and D. As such, this design allowed us 
to avoid observing choice behaviour based solely on the strong preference among respondents 
for one brand over another. For example, even if a respondent strongly preferred Sony they still 
had to consider which Sony option to choose based on the other product features.  
Data Collection 
For our main study we used an online panel from the global company GMI Lightspeed to survey 
420 people over 18 years of age and who regularly watched television at home on a television 
set. We quota controlled age and gender so that our respondents were representative of the 
Australian population. The median response time to complete the questionnaire was 14 minutes. 
We identified 25 respondents that rushed through the data collection task and subsequently did 
not discriminate amongst the companies or the product choices; this group was removed from the 
analysis, resulting in a final sample of 395 respondents. Simulations of the model performed 
prior to data collection indicated this sample size would still be more than adequate given the 
nature of the experimental design balanced against the number of responses provided by 
respondents (Johnson & Orme, 2003; Rose & Bliemer, 2013). Such demands on sample size 
were smaller relative to other studies as the model included information provided about the most 
and least preferred options rather than the most preferred option only (Louviere, 2013). 
      
Analysis & Results 
Corporate Reputation Measure and Manipulation Checks 
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The primary variable of interest in Equations (3) to (6) is CRij, which captures how each 
individual evaluates each corporation with respect to its reputation. Appendix 1 presents the 
instrument validation from both the pilot (n=116) and the full experiment (n=395). Respondents 
also nominated which company had the best and the worst corporate reputation, described as 
their admiration and respect for the company that made television sets. In the main experiment, 
Sony was nominated in the majority of cases as having the best reputation (58% of respondents), 
followed by Panasonic (34%), and Toshiba (8%). Likewise, respondents were least likely to 
nominate Sony as having the worst reputation (16%) as compared to Panasonic (25%) or 
Toshiba (60%). 
Fombrun and van Riel’s (2004) salience based model of reputation noted earlier suggests 
that respondents would be most knowledgeable about Sony and least knowledgeable about 
Toshiba. After evaluating each company on each of the 20 RQ characteristics of reputation, we 
asked respondents to rate their overall knowledge of these characteristics for each company on a 
10-point scale from “no knowledge” to “extremely knowledgeable”. The average level of 
knowledge for each company was consistent with the pre-test results, with respondents being 
moderately knowledgeable about all companies, but significantly more knowledgeable of Sony 
(MSony = 5.84; SD = 2.33) and Panasonic (MPanasonic = 5.5; SD = 2.27), and being least 
knowledgeable of Toshiba (MToshiba = 4.9; SD = 2.34). Differences in knowledge of each pair of 
companies were all significantly different (p < .01). We also confirmed that the moderate and 
low clarity features found in the pilot occurred in the main experiment. The results were that 
these sets of features were significantly different in clarity (p<.001), with a mean clarity rating of 





We used a conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) to model respondents’ preferred television. 
The product features, a brand constant, a propensity to buy constant, and respondents’ individual 
evaluations of the reputation of the companies were used as predictors of their choices. The 
resulting parameter estimates indicate the changes in utility that occur when a product feature is 
introduced relative to when it is not and whether such changes significantly alter predicted 
choice probabilities (see Table 3). Our results suggest that product features that are important 
and easier to understand (have greater clarity) are more likely to affect preferences for 
televisions, whilst, as expected – lower prices are preferable. Model fit statistics in the form of 
approximate R-squares are consistent with the lower fits observed in cases involving cross-
sectional data and a discrete multinomial outcome relative to those with a continuous dependent 
variable (Louviere et al., 2000, pp. 54-55).  
Hypothesis Tests 
Equation (2) is the base model for the choice experiments used in this study. It hypothesizes that 
the utility of a television is co-determined by its brand (H1a), price (H1b) and product attributes 
(H1c). In Table 3, the coefficients for each brand are significant and signs consistent with the 
pre-test results with Sony products being the most preferred whilst Toshiba is not as well 
regarded as the other two companies as a manufacturer of televisions; this provides support for 
H1a. The coefficient for price is negative and significant indicating respondents prefer products 
that are lower in price to those higher in price and thereby providing support for H1b. Also in 
Table 3, the marginal utility associated with most of the product features are significant (with the 
exception of being wall mountable and having digital output) and with the expected sign as per 
H1c. These results support Hypothesis 1.  
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Table 3. COMPETING MODELS OF TELEVISION CHOICES  
 
 Model 1 (without CR) 
(H1a-H1c) 
Model 2 (with CR)  
(H2-H6) 
 Est. β Est./se  Est. β Est./se  
Constant       
                          Propensity to buy constant (α) .01 (.07) .10  .08 (.08) 1.10  
       
Brands (β1)       
Sony .23 (.02) 12.96 *** .06 (.02) 3.23 *** 
Panasonic .10 (.02) 5.82 *** .07 (.02) 3.76 *** 
Toshiba^ -.34 (.02) -18.07 *** -.13 (.02) -6.51 *** 
Attributes with low clarity (β2)          
24P true cinema .05 (.02) 2.45 ** .05 (.02) 2.47 ** 
DTS 2.0+Digital out .02 (.02) 0.88   .02 (.02) 0.77  
Backlight control      .00 ( -  ) -        .00 ( -  )  -  
Dynamic range control .04 (.02) 2.25 ** .05 (.02) 2.59 ** 
Attributes with moderate clarity (β2)          
Wall mountable -.02 (.02) -0.98   -.02 (.02) -1.10  
Super slim design .09 (.02) 4.68 *** .09 (.02) 4.51 *** 
Large number of USB ports .08 (.02) 4.15 *** .07 (.02) 3.91 *** 
PVR - Personal TV/Video Recorder .11 (.02) 6.04 *** .12 (.02) 6.34 *** 
Attributes with high clarity (β2)          
55'' Screen Size (vs. 50'') .18 (.01) 14.22 *** .19 (.01) 14.49 *** 
3 year warranty (vs. 1 year) .30 (.01) 23.57 *** .32 (.01) 24.02 *** 
Price (in $100, mean centred) (β3) -.25 (.01) -27.60 *** -.25 (.01) -27.71 *** 
       
Corporate Reputation (CR)           
Individual Evaluation of CR (β4) -   .59 (.03) 18.55 *** 
Individual Knowledge of CR (β7) -   .10 (.01) 7.33 *** 
       
CR * Attributes Interactions (β6)       
CR* low clarity: -      
CR* 24P true cinema -   -.02 (.02) -1.05  
CR* DTS 2.0+Digital out -   -.01 (.02) -.61  
CR* Backlight control -      .00 ( - ) -  
CR * Dynamic range control -   -.02 (.02) -1.50  
CR* moderate clarity:       
CR* Wall mountable -   .01 (.02) .48  
CR* Super slim design -   .00 (.02) .23  
CR* Large number of USBs -   .00 (.02) .16  
CR * PVR -   .01 (.02) .90  
CR* high clarity:       
CR * Screen Size -   .03 (.01) 2.59 *** 
CR * Warranty -   .03 (.01) 2.33 ** 
CR * Price (β5) -   .03 (.01) 2.59 *** 
Product Category Knowledge (β8)    -.07 (.04)   
Model Statistics          
Log likelihood -12860.88     -12347.74   
Number of respondents 395     395   
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.072   0.108   
Note: standard errors recorded in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%;  
^ recovered estimate of brand-effects relating to Toshiba obtained via relationship with two other effects coded brand-specific terms 
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In Table 3, the estimates associated with the proposed model, Model 2, are presented. This 
model differs from Model 1 by the inclusion of a measure of corporate reputation - CRij, a 
standardized measure of reputation for each company-brand for each individual derived from the 
structural equation model (Appendix 1). As such, its inclusion partials out the overall aggregate 
brand name effects observed in Model 1 into the individual reputation effects for each company. 
A likelihood-ratio test confirms it as being a superior model to predict consumer choices (χ2 
=1026.28; p<.001). The parameter estimate of β4, capturing individual variation for reputation of 
these three companies, is positive and significant (p<.001). As such, it indicates that individuals 
placed significant weight on corporate reputation when making choices among competing 
offerings. This result support Hypothesis 2. 
In Table 3, we also introduce a set of terms that capture how individual level evaluations of 
corporate reputation may moderate the marginal utility of some product features, a key departure 
from previous models focusing on the general halo effects of corporate reputation. Hypothesis 3 
focuses on the sensitivity that individuals have to the price of products being offered by a 
reputable company. The significant negative coefficient for β4 confirms that respondents were 
significantly more likely to choose products that were lower in price as per H1b; however, the 
significant positive coefficient for β5 in Model 3 confirms that individuals were significantly less 
(more) sensitive to the price of products offered by more (less) reputable companies (p <.05), 
thereby providing support for Hypothesis 3. 
In Model 2, we also introduce terms that capture how individual level evaluations of 
corporate reputation may change the preference for other product features. First, the results 
reveal that overall corporate reputation has no significant impact on moderating the marginal 
utility of any product feature with low or moderate product clarity. In contrast, changes in 
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corporate reputation had a significant impact on effecting the evaluation of two product features 
with high clarity, namely, screen size and warranty (p <.05). This implies that product features 
with high clarity have a higher marginal utility when offered by a company that is evaluated as 
having a better reputation relative to its competitors. As a result, these results confirm the 
predictions made in Hypothesis 4 that corporate reputation moderates the marginal utility of 
product features, but only for those features that are higher in value and more clearly understood 
by consumers. 
Table 3 also introduces two individual-level variables capturing the role of knowledge in 
influencing product choice. The first variable captures a respondent’s perceived knowledge of 
the company’s reputation. We see that β7 is significant (p <.001) indicating that increases in 
overall knowledge of a company significantly increases the utility associated with products that 
it offers. This result provides support for Hypothesis 5 and the salience conceptualization of 
corporate reputation noted earlier. 
The second knowledge-related variable is a five-item measure derived from Flynn and 
Goldstein (1999) to assess the subjective level of knowledge that a person has about the products 
under investigation. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed on 
seven-point Likert scales on items such as whether they “feel very knowledgeable about 
televisions” and whether among their circle of friends they are “one of the experts on television”. 
This measure was used to see if product knowledge influences the propensity to purchase any 
television in addition to the impact of the reputation of the company selling the product under 
consideration. As shown, the parameter capturing this effect, β8, is not significant, thereby not 
providing support for Hypothesis 6. This indicates that intentions to purchase a new television 
did not vary across individuals because of differences in product category knowledge. One 
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possible explanation for this is that the screening of respondents resulted in focusing on only 
qualified respondents who were already in the market for a new television; hence, intentions to 
purchase and/or category knowledge may have had less variation across this sample relative to a 
wider population of consumers as studied in other settings (e.g., Burke, 2013).  
Finally, to further illustrate the effects of corporate reputation, we compute an estimate of 
the willingness to pay (WTP) for a television backed by a more reputable company. This 
estimate is calculated by assuming that two companies A and B are selling their products in this 
market at the average price in the choice experimental conditions of $1,749. We then set one 
company’s reputation at a level of one standard deviation above the other and calculate the price 
level at which A and B will have an equal probability of being chosen. That is, the WTP 
estimates are obtained by determining an equalization price such that the market shares of the 
two offerings are equal; a similar approach is used by Swait et al. (1993) in the context of brand 
equity. The results of these calculations are based on the estimates of the final model in Table 3 
and reveal that if Company B is a standard deviation better in corporate reputation compared to 
the market average reputation it will have an equilibrium price of $1,901. This average WTP 
implies that a one standard deviation improvement in corporate reputation is worth $152; 
equivalent to a premium of 8.7%. This estimate can be compared to the average WTP for various 
product features, as is shown in Figure 3. This illustrates the significant impact of improvements 
to corporate reputation on utility judgments and consumer choices relative to how various 





FIGURE 3: Willingness to Pay Estimates for Features and Corporate Reputation  
 
One caveat to these figures, however, is that as Hypothesis 4 was supported, the WTP can 
vary for a product feature depending on the corporate reputation of the company offering the 
product. For example, in the case of screen size, consumers are willing to pay $121 more for a 
television that is 55” over one that is 50”; this WTP amount increases to $147 if the same offer is 
made by a company that is one standard deviation higher on the corporate reputation measure. 
Similarly, a consumer is willing to pay $198 more for a television which comes with a three year 
warranty against an identical television offered with a one year warranty; this difference 
increases to $221 when the same television is offered by a company one standard deviation 
higher with respect to its reputation. However, as was previously reported in relation to 
Hypothesis 4, the impact of corporate reputation on differences in WTP for product features is 
negligible for all other features included in the study. For example, the WTP for a Personal 
Video Recorder is $63 regardless of the corporate reputation of the company offering the product 





The literature has shown that corporate reputation activities can provide valuable 
outcomes to multiple stakeholders (Arikan et al., 2016; Fombrun, 1996; Roper & Davies, 2007). 
These outcomes have been considered across a number of dimensions, particularly with respect 
to financial performance and market valuation among investors (Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Tischer & Hildebrandt, 2014) and an organization’s ability to attract 
and retain employees (Auger, Devinney, Dowling, Eckert, & Lin, 2013; Greening & Turban, 
2000; Turker, 2009). In this research, we examined the role of corporate reputation in consumer 
choices, focusing on whether it enhances the overall and feature-specific utility of televisions 
offered in a competitive context. Our choice-based methodology indicates that holding a better 
reputation than one’s direct competitors increases the overall utility of a product, it reduces price 
sensitivity, and it moderates the marginal utility of some important features of the product. 
Further, the reputation effect partially depends on how much the respondent knows about the 
company that is associated with the product they are considering to buy.  
The findings indicate that companies with poorer reputations are less likely to have their 
products be chosen by consumers (as per a halo effect), but they are also likely to lose ground on 
several other product features. In the same manner in which corporate reputation can signal 
overall quality, the findings show that it is a useful signal of the quality of features; in turn, this 
alters preferences and influences how specific product features are evaluated (Boulding & 
Kirmani, 1993). Specifically, we found that larger screen sized televisions were less likely to be 
chosen when offered by a company with a poorer corporate reputation. Similarly, we found that 
those companies with poorer reputations should be cautious in trying to compete against those 
38 
 
with better reputations, especially by offering products with similar warranties. One strategic 
implication of this is that when companies are seeing their reputations damaged in one product 
category or at the organization level, the damage may extend to how some product features are 
evaluated in other categories.  
The research, however, found no evidence for corporate reputation being a mechanism to 
enhance the marginal utility of product features that are trivial or poorly understood by 
consumers. It indicates that consumers have a limit to how much they are willing to pay for some 
product features even when the most reputable company is offering the feature. Instead it 
reinforces a view that marketers need to continue to offer product features that are important and 
understood rather than those that are meaningless or trivial (c.f., Broniarczyk & Gershoff, 2003; 
Carpenter et al., 1994). The research also cautions against those with poorer reputations to 
compete against competitors with better reputations based on price. Instead, the findings suggest 
that those with poorer reputations need to continue to work on corporate branding activities as 
well as finding ways in which to offer more attractive products for consumers (Balmer, 2001; 
Balmer & Gray, 2003; Yu Xie & Boggs, 2006).  
The findings in relation to individual knowledge about corporate reputation also 
demonstrate the importance of maintaining corporate visibility to further enhance the preference 
for a product. That is, efforts that promote a corporation’s activities relating to the various facets 
of corporate reputation as measured in the RQ scale are all capable of enhancing reputational 
knowledge and value among consumers and are therefore warranted. The results speak to the 
suggestion that salience is an important component in driving reputation and subsequent 
competitive advantage (Fombrun & van Riel, 2004; Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011). For marketers, 
these results reinforce their efforts in creating ‘fame’ around the company behind the brand and 
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leveraging this salience via strategies like a branded house (Aaker, 2004; Aaker & 
Joachimsthaler, 2000). It also suggests merit in considering co-branding activities led by the 
company name (Rao, Qu, & Ruekert, 1999). 
An extension of this research would be to assess whether different aspects of corporate 
reputation lead to different product evaluations. For example, many studies of consumer 
reactions to companies focus on the social reputation of the company as a driver of engagement 
and product evaluation (e.g., Chernev & Blair, 2015; Klein & Dawar, 2004). However, in our 
analysis of the measurement properties of the RQ measure (see Appendix 1) we find that the 
correlation of each aspect of reputation with the overall measure to be so high that the analysis of 
any single aspect produces results that are indistinguishable from those reported in Table 3. 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
The generalizability of the findings of our study is limited by a number of factors including the 
nature of our respondents (Australians), the product category studied (television), and the nature 
of our measure of corporate reputation (Dowling, 2016b). As such, whilst we found general 
support for each of the hypothesized effects consistent with an investigation of theory application 
(Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981), we also consider how the results might generalize across 
different settings and related boundary conditions.  
As previously mentioned, there are various types of brand hierarchies used to create a link 
between a corporate and a product brand (Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2000). In this research we did 
not separate the effects of either because the chosen context was one in which the brand name 
and company name were identical. As such, it would be interesting to explore replications of the 
research in which the impact of the product brand and corporate brand could be considered 
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separately. For example, it would be insightful to see the impact of the corporate reputation of 
General Motors in the context of consumer car purchases as separated from brands such as 
Buick, Cadillac, or Chevrolet, all of which fall under its ownership.  
As we illustrate here, the reputation of a company can have a significant impact on product 
choice. Further, as the nature of the approach was to measure the relative impact of product 
features, price and corporate reputation, one strategic implication of these findings is that the 
building of corporate reputation is extremely important overall relative to distinguishing products 
solely on their product features. While this finding is consistent with many claims made by 
reputation practitioners, it is yet to be tested alongside the valuation of other product features. As 
such, the findings provide further motivation for companies to design and implement programs 
that enhance the reputation of their company in the eyes of consumers. 
Our study also suggests that reputation enhancing activities will be most successful for 
consumers if they are also targeted at enhancing the valence of specific product features. Here, 
the good reputation of the company can deliver both a general effect and some feature-specific 
effects. For example, a company that seeks to be admired for its social responsibility should 
ensure that these activities also link directly to some product features. Few large companies that 
embark on broad CSR programs seem to take this extra step. Also, a company that seeks to be 
known for its innovation should ensure that this corporate characteristic is visible in the features 
of its products or in the customer interface design. For example, when Steve Jobs ran Apple 
many customers thought that the company was innovative and led by a charismatic rogue. Both 
these company characteristics supported the overall value proposition offered by Apple’s various 
products and services. They could also be seen in many new features offered by the range of 
iProducts. Periodically Apple would make reference to its character and culture in its corporate 
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advertising to advance the idea that the company behind the product mattered to what was its 
essential customer value proposition. 
In the broader context, our results also suggest that there is merit in companies drawing 
attention to their corporate reputation. As discussed, companies such as Apple and 3M are well 
known for doing so. A more extreme example of this is Cooper’s beer (an Australian brand), 
who uses the corporate slogan “Our name is on the bottle, our reputation is inside it”. At present, 
however, drawing attention to the reputation of the company that stands behind or beside the 
product is not a common communication strategy. One reason for this could be that companies 
are worried that a corporate crisis that degrades their reputation will then adversely affect their 
products (Greyser, 2009; Klein & Dawar, 2004). However, our research suggests that those 
companies that are well regarded may be missing an opportunity to trade on one of their 
strongest market-based assets. Taking up this opportunity, however, comes with the 
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Appendix 1: Reputation Quotient Measurement 
The Reputation Quotient (RQ) was developed to be a multi-stakeholder measure of corporate 
reputation (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever, 2000). Thus, it is suitable for use with a group of 
people from a wide range of backgrounds, in this case a variety of potential consumers. 
Conceptually the construct of reputation defined by Fombrun, noted in the paper, and measured 
by the RQ is a multi-attribute evaluation of a company. Agarwal, Osiyevskyy and Feldman 
(2015, p. 488) suggest that it is best modelled and measured as a second-order reflective 
construct. Hence, we performed a structural equation model analysis (SEM) on RQ as shown in 
Figure 4. 
The instrument includes 20 items that are construed to form into six latent constructs of 
corporate reputation. In the following example, the measurement model shows the six latent 
constructs and their relative items to measure the corporate reputation of Sony, as we did in the 
formal survey. For a different company, the word “Sony” can be replaced with a different 
company name. 
Construct 1: Emotional Appeal (AP) 
X1: I have a good feeling about Sony 
X2: I admire and respect Sony 
X3: I trust Sony 
Construct 2: Product and Services (PS) 
X4: Sony stands behind its products and services 
X5: Sony develops innovative products and services 
X6: Sony offers high quality products and services 
X7: Sony offers products and services that are a good value for money 
Construct 3: Vision and Leadership (LD) 
X8: Sony has excellent leadership 
X9: Sony has a clear vision for its future 
X10: Sony recognizes and takes advantage of market opportunities 
Construct 4: Workplace Environment (WE) 
X11: Sony is well-managed 
X12: Sony looks like a good company to work for 
X13: Sony looks like a company that would have good employees 
Construct 5: Social and Environment Responsibility (SER) 
X14: Sony supports good causes 
 
 
X15: Sony is an environmentally responsible company 
X16: Sony maintains high standards in the way it treats people 
Construct 6: Financial Performance (FP) 
X17: Sony has a strong record of profitability 
X18: Sony looks like a low risk investment 
X19: Sony tends to outperform its competitors 
X20: Sony looks like a company with strong prospects for future growth 
 
We first tested RQ with 116 pilot respondents. Each respondent was asked to nominate the 
companies that sold televisions they believed had the best and worst corporate reputation. We 
then piped in these company names for each respondent to rate on the 20 RQ statements. They 
were rated using 7-point Likert scales labelled “1 strongly disagree” to “7 strongly agree”. This 
ensured that respondents were answering questions about a particular company.  
To test the structure of the instrument we used structural equation modelling (SEM) to 
recover the six latent constructs. The results of the SEM in Table 1 show an acceptable level of 
statistical fit for the key indicators RMSEA and CFI, even with a small sample of 116 
respondents (e.g., MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Figure 1 shows the theoretical 
model using the pilot data, demonstrating strong and sound relationships between the 20 
observed variables, six latent constructs and the top level latent construct of CR. Also, reliability 
results show the theoretical measurement model has a high level of reliability, with Cronbach 
alpha at 0.98 for “Emotional Appeal”, 0.96 for “Product Services”, 0.96 for “Vision and 
Leadership”, 0.98 for “Workplace Environment”, 0.96 for “Social and Environment 
Responsibility” and 0.97 for Financial Performance” respectively. 
In the formal study, we asked a sample of 395 people who intended purchase a television set 
to rate the reputations of Sony, Panasonic and Toshiba using the 20 RQ items on 7-point Likert 
scales. Similar to how we analysed the pilot data we combined the rating data for all three 
companies and performed the same SEM analysis. The SEM results shown in Figure 5 were 
 
 
similar to those obtained in the pilot study with slightly better statistical fits (e.g., RMSEA is 
0.062, which improved from the pilot results of 0.073). 
For each respondent we had three predicted reputation scores, one for each company. These 
scores were standardized to allow better comparison and model interpretation, such as for the 
willingness-to-pay estimates reported in the paper. We then embedded these scores into the 
choice data by matching each reputation score with its corresponding brand.  
To further validate our approach to measuring corporate reputation we also asked 
respondents to rate the reputation of Sony, Panasonic and Toshiba on a 10-point scale where the 
answer options were “very poor” to “very good”. Here Sony received an average rating of M = 
7.15 (SD = 1.81), Panasonic M = 6.78 (SD = 1.76) and Toshiba M = 6.17 (SD = 1.8). Bergkvist 
and Rossiter (2007) suggest that in many cases single-item measures are just as reliable as their 
multi-item counterparts. The correlation between these self-stated overall measures of corporate 
reputation and the corresponding latent corporate reputation measures is 0.76 overall. This 
further indicates our measures adequately capture reputations of the companies investigated. 
Table 5: Structural Equation Model Fit Statistics – Pilot and Formal Studies 
Fit Statistics Pilot Study 
(n = 116) 
Formal Study 
(n = 395) 
Population Error   
RMSEA (Root mean squared error of 
approximation) 
0.073 0.062 
Information Criteria   
AIC (Akaike's information criterion) 9754.01 45996.69 
BIC (Bayesian information criterion) 10095.24 46473.97 
Baseline Comparison   
CFI (Comparative fit index) 0.98 0.98 
TLI (Tucker-Lewis index) 0.97 0.98 
Size of Residuals   
SRMR (Standardized root mean squared residual) 0.01 0.02 




Figure 4: Relationships in the SEM model using ratings data on self-selected companies 
with the best and worst corporate reputation (n=116) 
 
 
Figure 5: Relationships in the SEM model using ratings data on the three brands Sony, 
Panasonic and Toshiba (n=395) 
 
